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Introduction
The Creative Commons (CC) (Creative Commons 2010) community offers an increasingly popular menu of licenses for copyrightable works. We present an economic analysis of the consequences of such licensing options to negotiations between Authors of works and Publishers who market and distribute the works. There exists scant previous work on the economics of CC, so we compare our results mainly to the literature on piracy and copying of works. CC licensing retains the connection between the Author and his work. The outcome is different from free distribution, shareware or piracy (Ramello 2004 , Hietanen 2008 . The Author chooses attributes to his license in a way he finds optimal. Such licensing is considered to be helpful in getting new unknown artistic output to market (Lessig 2003) . Like Open Source programming, the Creative Commons licensing has its roots in ideological movements. However it is a new instrument in the market for copyright works. It retains some of the Author's rights but gives out the Publisher's rights. With mere copyright there was no separation of benefits of Author and Publisher.
We ask: When does the Author find it profitable to utilize a CC license for a portion of his work and what share does he CC license? How does the introduction of the CC licensing affect the negotiations between the Author and Publisher over the sharing of the profit from the copyright work? Does the introduction of the option to utilize CC licensing affect welfare? We consider a set-up where an Author creates a work, the Publisher distributes it and oversees the copyright. Consumers in turn decide whether to buy the work. Both the Author and Publisher receive revenue from the sales of the work under copyright. Importantly, the Author receives additional revenue from eg. live performances. Our key assumption is that the level of that revenue depends on the number of consumers that are aware of the Author's works (have for example heard recordings etc.). From an economics point of view, the CC licenses seem interesting since they allow the Author to decide over the level of protection over portions of his works.
2
The Author may CC license a portion of his work and this may increase the number of consumers acquiring his work. The trade-off is that this portion cannot be sold through the Publisher as copyright work. Should the preferences of the Author and Publisher differ, it is the Author that determines the level of protection by CC licensing.
We find that given the value of publicity and the distribution cost we find the optimal level of CC licensing. It is increasing in value of publicity, cost and decreasing in the share of copyright revenue to author. Without CC licenses, bargaining is straightforward.
Author and Publisher gain monotonically in shares of the copyright revenue. If CC licenses are available, the negotiation setup changes. To the Author the bargaining remains similar. But to the Publisher, there is a dramatic change. He voluntarily concedes a share of the revenue to the Author. Either the Author's share is such that the Author CC licenses a portion of his work and the Publisher, taking into account this, is willing to set the Author's share optimally to maximize his profit from the copyright work. Or, if the profit from deterring the Author from CC licensing is higher, the Publisher gives the Author a share that makes it optimal for the author not to CC license at all. The author may prefer CC licensing, for the publisher it is not desirable. The effect of CC licensing to bargaining does not have effect to an Author that is strong in bargaining, since his share is always larger than any of the concession points described. The CC licensing improves the position of weak Authors. If the Author and Publisher can agree on sharing the Author's outside revenue too, they will do that. Given a bargaining outcome it is always possible to increase profits to both parties by setting another sharing rule that includes the outside revenue and optimizing the portion of work to be CC licensed. CC licensing may or may not increase welfare. The CC licensed portion of the work increases welfare. Some consumers that would not buy the copyright work, acquire the CC licensed work. Also the profit from a larger audience increases welfare. However, the surplus to the consumers with high willingness to pay decreases as the copyright work is now of lesser value. The contractual relationships between Authors and Publishers were described by Caves (2003) . He asserts the bilateral nature of such contracts and also that the contracts are signed well before actual sales. Towse (2006) further pointed out the weak position of the Authors in bargaining and the Authors rights to decide over their work even after contracting. Krueger (2005) and Connolly and Krueger (2006) have researched performance revenues of artists. They found that performance revenue is significant and 4 that it has grown faster that revenue from copyright works. Our approach has similarities with economic literature of piracy, illegal copying of works (for a survey, see Peitz and Waelbroek 2003) . The CC licensed share of work has also a zero price and can be distributed freely. In piracy, the copier faces a cost of getting caught and Authors and possible Publishers lose revenue. With CC licensing the cost is lost revenue. The benefits of piracy accrue to the consumers (copiers) and, as in some models (Takayama 1994 (Takayama , 1997 , also to copyright holders, if there are network effects. In the case of CC licensing, the Author and consumers benefit. The Author receives higher performance revenues and poor consumers can acquire a share of the work for free. Gayer and Shy (2006) considered piracy in a setting where an Author and a Publisher share the revenue from copyright works but where the Author receives all revenue from performances. They found that the Author may accept illegal copying since it enlarges the potential audience for performances. Our approach builds on this analysis. We, however, model the Author's decision to optimal CC licensing and consider the consequences of such decisions to the bargaining between parties. CC licensing and sampling have similarities. Peitz and Waelbroek (2006) considered a scenario where a monopolist may allow partial free downloading ("sampling") of works. The idea is that this increases the precision of consumers' demand and thus benefits the monopolist.
In the following we analyze the optimal CC decision of the Author and given that, the bargaining between the Author and Publisher. Joint decisions over CC and welfare issues are discussed.
The model
We present a model to analyze how the introduction of CC licensing affects the relations between the Publisher and Author of a work under copyright. The Publisher receives a share of 1 s and The Author a share of s of the profits from the sales of the Author's copyright output. The Publisher's objective is profit maximization from the sales of work under copyright. The Author's objective is to maximize profits from two sources. First, he receives a share of the copyright revenue and second, key to our model, he receives outside revenue from public appearances (see gayer shy concerts…). There is a market for the copyright work. The potential consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the work. They are indexed on real line by 0,1 x according to a linearly declining willingness to pay. Willingness to pay for the good is on the interval 0,1 . We assume that there exists a unit cost 0 c for distributing the work. Let N to be the total number of consumers that are aware of the Author through buying or acquiring his work.
We model the outside revenue to depend on the awareness linearly, o N .
The timing in our model is the following. If the CC license is not available to the Author, we assume that he will not release any share of his work free. We motivate this assumption is that without the license contract 1 We assume that the CC licensed work is not included in the distribution media of the copyright work.
Furthermore, we assume that a consumer either acquires the CC licensed share or buys the remaining copyright work. An alternative specification is that also those consumers that buy the copyright work acquire the CC licensed share of work. See appendix. 
Welfare aspects
The total surplus from profits and consumer surplus (excluding possible consumer surplus from performances) is in the absence of CC licensing 31 1 82 cr cc c W .
